# 1NC OFF

### T USFG

#### Our interpretation is the 1AC must include a defense of the federal government prohibiting anti-competitive business practices

#### A – Antirust ‘prohibitions’ are federal and legal and distinct from private action

Boner and Krueger, ‘91 (Roger Alan and Reinald, World Bank, “The Basics of Antitrust Policy”, *World Bank Technical Paper No 160,* <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/606101468764357774/pdf/multi-page.pdf>, DoA 5/31/2021, DVOG)

Of all nations, none has a longer history of active intervention in marketplace competition through antitrust policy than the United States. The statutory basis of antitrust policy in the U.S. rests on three federal laws--the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. Significant amendments occurred in the Robinson Patman Act of 1936 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, which provided for pre-merger notification.A1 These antitrust statutes apply to interstate commerce and are enforced at the federal level by two agencies, the Department of Justice, an executive agency, and the Federal Trade Commission.0 In addition, enforcement actions can be brought by the attorneys general of the fifty states and by private parties who have suffered injury owing to violations of the antitrust laws. Approximately 96% of the civil antitrust suits in the U.S. are brought by private parties.YJ The antitrust statutes of the United States, reflecting a pattern often repeated elsewhere, were written into law following a period of marked economic expansion with numerous mergers and consolidations. A variety of restraints on competition, widely employed by large businesses, caused great popular resentment. In response, the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 to inhibit a variety of practices viewed as injurious restraints on competition. Section 1 of the Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, section 2 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and combinations or conspiracies to monopolize, and section 7 (later superceded by Section 4 of the Clayton Act) permits private parties injured by Sherman Act violations to sue for recovery of three times the amount of damages. The ability of private parties to recover treble damages for antitrust violations is unusual among the surveyed jurisdictions and constitutes a comparatively strong deterrent to violating the antitrust law.9 Though the Sherman Act was designed to enjoin a broad variety of anticompetitive business practices, the Act was not effectively enforced for a number of years. Moreover, the Sherman Act applies strictly to the conduct of business, and the prosecution of violations requires that enforcers meet the high standard of showing that particular conduct was motivated by the restraint of competition or monopolization of a market. To broaden the scope of antitrust legislation, the Clayton Act was passed to cover other potentially anti competitive practices and to prohibit conduct likely to support the restraint of trade. Section 2 of the Clayton Act (later amended by the Robinson Patman Act) prohibits price discrimination in support of the restraint of trade or monopolization of a market, and Section 3 prohibits tying and exclusive dealing contracts in restraint of competition. More important, the Clayton Act serves to discourage the development of certain structural pre-conditions of anticompetitive behavior: Section 7 prohibits mergers tending to substantially lessen competition, and Section 8 prohibits interlocking directorates among competing firms.& The Federal Trade Commission Act was passed in part to streamline the procedures for enforcing the antitrust laws. Whereas the Department of Justice, as the primary federal law enforcement agency, has broad responsibilities to enforce federal law, the Federal Trade Commission Act created the Federal Trade Commission as an administrative agency with special expertise in business and commerce and with quasi-judicial authority to enforce the antitrust laws.!V Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair methods of competition," which includes acts illegal under the Sherman and Clayton acts. In addition, judicial decisions have found section 5 to cover practices that offend public policy or cause substantial injury to consumers, potentially extending the applicability of the FTC Act beyond that of the other antitrust statutes. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have dual responsibility to enforce the federal antitrust laws, a situation unique among the surveyed jurisdictions. Both criminal and civil cases can be brought by the Department of Justice and decided in federal district courts, with appeal to the appellate courts and the Supreme Court. In contrast, the FTC can bring only civil cases and can adjudicate cases through independent administrative law judges, with appeal to the federal courts and the Supreme Court.§9 To some extent, the FTC and the Department of Justice coordinate their activities in areas of overlapping responsibility, as in merger review for which each agency has developed particular areas of expertise. Otherwise, the dual enforcement approach of the U.S. provides for a broad, interventionist application of antitrust laws, since potentially anticompetitive actions can be challenged by either the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. The 1936 Robinson-Patman Act, written to amend Section 2 of the Clayton Act, is a more complex and comprehensive statute prohibiting resale price maintenance. Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits discriminating in price between different buyers, limits the brokerage and other compensatory fees between a buyer and seller, and prohibits the use of discriminatory advertising or promotional allowances by sellers. Buyers as well as sellers are subject to the prohibitions, and Section 3 of the Act provides criminal sanctions for certain kinds of discriminatory pricing. 1 With respect to other surveyed economies, several features of U.S. antitrust law stand out. The U.S. is the only one maintaining separate government agencies that share parallel authority to enforce the antitrust laws; federal enforcement, shared by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, operates alongside enforcement by the attorneys general of the fifty states and is substantially augmented by private enforcement**.** The treble damages available to private litigants constitute a very strong financial deterrent against antitrust violations as well as a strong incentive for private litigation. Finally, though a variety of activities are exempted from antitrust law, the selective granting of exemptions is used very seldom and is not an important feature of antitrust law enforcement in the USA.

#### B – ‘Its’ means possessive

Macmillan Dictionary

[“its”, Macmillan Dictionary, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/its, accessed 8-15-15, AFB]

Its is the possessive form of it.

1 belonging or relating to a thing, idea, place, animal, etc. when it has already been mentioned or when it is obvious which one you are referring to

The chair lay on its side.

We were eager to see Las Vegas and all its many attractions.

The bull had a ring through its nose.

Synonyms and related words

Determiners: a, an, certain...

Explore Thesaurus

#### C – That means the aff must modify federal law

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The affirmative doesn’t propose a hypothetical government action – vote negative –

#### First is clash – stable ground and limits enable contestation and is vital to the neg effectively researching and refuting the 1AC, including by utilizing their 1AC on the negative. That turns any offense they can access because engagement is necessary for actualizing their strategy.

#### There’s no link to most Ks of framework – we are not defending the resolution as a ceiling, end point, or total limit, but as a floor and starting point to ensure the neg knows what to research and disprove.

#### Second is limits:

#### Some predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win – radical aff choice with no floor puts the aff too far ahead. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around disproving the resolution as a point of offense, and obviating that research structurally favors the affirmative.

#### Fairness is an intrinsic good – debate can be more than a game and also a game, and games always requires effective competition expectations – the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate is if the judge can make an objective decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to research.

#### This precedes substance – our ability to refute any argument cannot be disentangled from our inability to research it – be skeptical of whether an argument of was ‘dropped’ or whether it was simply impossible to prepare to defeat.

#### Third is antitrust debates – studying antitrust law via switch-side debate is vital to interdisciplinary skills that both spill up *and* allow us to better understand the historical and social foundations of antitrust

Biester, 11 – Edward, partner in the Philadelphia office of the law firm of Duane Morris LLP, and co-chair of the firm’s Antitrust and Competition Practice Group. “Understanding Antitrust Laws, Competition, the Economy, and Their Impact on Our Everyday Lives,” Social Education 75(2), pp 68–72, <https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public_education/lookingatthelaw_marapril.pdf> -- Iowa

Looking at the Law: Why should antitrust law and economic regulation be important parts of a high school social studies curriculum?

E.B.: These topics bring together many disciplines and allow students to imagine and experience their application to real world scenarios, at a time when students are learning and questioning just how the world works. Studying antitrust law and economic regulation will introduce students to concepts like the branches of government and how laws are made, enforced, and effect social policy. They allow students to take an historical view and observe how certain economic principles have emerged as economies and markets evolved. Students can decide why one rule or another would be positive or negative in scenarios that deal with their individual economic interests. These concepts also introduce students to the globalization of markets, trade, and legal governance, which will only become more important with time.

#### T is best evaluated under competing interpretations to reduce judge intervention.

#### TVA: The FTC should reclassify workers in the gig economy as employees rather than independent contractors.

#### The TVA solves – current antitrust law allows the exploitation of Black and brown workers.

**Kennedy 21** (Brendan Kennedy, public relations and communications specialist at NYSBA, “Yes America, Antitrust Laws Do perpetuate strucutral racism but they don’t have to”, <https://nysba.org/yes-america-antitrust-laws-do-perpetuate-structural-racism-but-they-dont-have-to/>, published 1/27/2021, accessed 1/30/2022)

The recently named acting commissioner of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has been very public about her desire to have antitrust enforcement become antiracist. While on maternity leave this summer, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter made her personal opinion known in a [public Twitter thread](https://twitter.com/RKSlaughterFTC/status/1303762105431207947) that sparked further discussion about equity within the antitrust community. Slaughter, along with panelists, Eleanor M. Fox, Deona T. Kalala, Leslie C. Overton and Sandeep Vaheesen, dispelled the notion that antitrust policies were neutral during a session held Jan. 25 by the Antitrust Law Section at the New York State Bar Association’s Annual Meeting. They suggested ways that antitrust laws can stop perpetuating inequality on communities of color. “There really isn’t such a thing as value-neutral enforcement,” Slaughter said. “All of our enforcement actions have consequences and I would rather have our system be clear-eyed about what these consequences are.” When talking specifically about racism, Slaughter explained that antitrust laws and enforcement are going to reinforce the structural inequities in our system, specifically in the gig economy. “We need to think very carefully in all of our cases about whether the actions we take or do not take will reinforce the structural inequities or break them down and make our markets more equitable,” Slaughter said. According to Vaheesen, the legal director at the Open Markets Institute in Washington D.C., surveys have indicated that the work being done in the gig economy is disproportionately done by people of color. On a larger scale, he believes that antitrust laws have been used to the detriment of Black and brown workers in ways that make our society more racist. The gig economy is made up of workers like Uber and Lyft drivers, Instacart shoppers and Doordash delivery drivers, whose businesses mainly run on apps. These tech companies have classified their workers as independent contractors, and this can lead to their workers losing some very basic rights. “These platforms can control and dictate things like rate of pay and commissions and direct trips and routes drivers take,” Vaheesen said. “Due to antitrust laws, these companies have the power of employers without the duty of them, so they don’t have to pay a minimum wage, overtime, workers compensation or healthcare benefits.” Vaheesen believes that this rise of the gig economy can be tied directly to changes in antitrust law that were enacted in the 1970s and 1980s under Republican administrations and left unchallenged by subsequent Democratic administrations in the 1990s and 2000s. “Antitrust laws say that workers who are classified as independent contractors cannot organize,” Vaheesen said. “Workers cannot come together and build power through unions, collective bargaining, or striking. So this gives a largely white group of business owners and venture capitalists the ability to control groups of Black and brown workers and prevent them from organizing.” Slaughter, who has sat on the FTC as a commissioner since 2018, agrees that the law has been used in this way but said that doesn’t have to be the case. “I have been vocal to the Department of Labor on the very topic of classifying gig economy workers as independent contractors,” Slaughter said. “From a competition perspective, misclassifying gig workers as non-employees inhibits their ability to compete for better wages and benefits and when viewed through this lens, it’s very problematic.” According to Fox, the Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation at NYU School of Law, it wasn’t always true that markets would benefit those with money and power. In fact, it was welcoming to outsiders until the 1970s. “We’ve skewed antitrust laws to benefit the insiders and free up incumbents so they can be more innovative,” Fox said. “Our laws don’t have to be this way and our economics are biased because assumptions are biased.” Data collection according to Overton, a partner at Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider in Washington D.C., and a former senior official in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Labor, is one way we can begin to end structural racism in our antitrust laws. “There is room for data collection that is more sensitized to these antiracism issues in order to make sure we’re identifying the full range of implications of conduct and company mergers so that we’re not marginalizing already marginalized groups,” Overton said. The consensus among the panelists coalesced around the notion that antitrust laws could use a reset and restating of their guiding principles. That would include determining whether the goals of such laws is to disperse power or consolidate it.

# Case

### Presumption

#### Vote negative on presumption – the plan a series of ideas with zero practical mechanism to disrupt debt relations – even if they win descriptions of the world the litmus test is whether disrupting subjectivity or aesthetics does anything to change the lived conditions described in the 1AC. They don’t –

#### 1 – Scope – Lazzarato is about the debtor-creditor relationship across all time and space – even if the aff can achieve localized disruptions of debt subjectivities it can never solve given hundreds of cultural differences the 1AC simply lumps into a universal binary

#### 2 – Entrenched market power – if Davies is right that corporations have gone beyond government regulation and control then how does discussing why neoliberalism is bad persuade well-financed actors to change behavior? Countless revolutions with much more than the aff failed to move the needle

#### 3 – Subjectivity – Murphy isn’t about internalizing debates over consumer welfare, it’s about Call of Duty and online game playing leading gamers to adopting violent subject positions – even if they transform the way debate views economicsthere’s no connection between economic theorizing in debate and the subject creation they criticize

#### 4 – Debt morality – Lazzarrato’s claim is that the guilt should be dropped from debt – there’s zero relationship between an individual choice to reject the imposition of guilt through debt and a structural solution no matter how many times the aff says the words assemblage theory

#### 5 – The aff isn’t key – if the Popa evidence is right that quote “affective apparatuses of control that leverage feelings of remorse and humiliation” are individual choices then you can easily refuse those choices without the aff or the call for the ballot

#### 6 – **No scientific basis for affect – psychological orientations are a result of social surroundings which means the judge should evaluate material consequences before rhetorical ones**

Martin, Professor in the Department of Anthropology @ New York University, 13

(Emily, “The Potentiality of Ethnography and the Limits of Affect Theory,” Current Anthropology: Vol. 54, No. S7)

Many scholars in the humanities have recently engaged with research in neuroscience to posit a view of a precognitive, preindividual stage of human perception that promises unrealized dimensions of potentiality. Here are some descriptions of affect in the words of two theorists from quite different disciplines. Nigel Thrift, a geographer, writes, In this paper I want to think about affect in cities and about affective cities … and, above all, about what the political consequences of thinking more explicitly about these topics might be—once it is accepted that the political decision is itself produced by a series of inhuman or pre-subjective forces and intensities. (Thrift 2004:58) Eric Shouse, a cultural critic, states, An affect is a non-conscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and unstructured potential. … Affect is always prior to and/or outside of consciousness. (Shouse 2005) There are a number of importantly different varieties of affect theory. Some are indebted to Silvan Tomkins’s (2008) writing and others to Francisco Varela’s work on open systems, often in the style of Deleuze and Guatarri (1987; Varela 1999). But taking into account their differences, historian Ruth Leys (2011) summarizes some of the main assumptions they hold in common: “For the theorists in question, affects are ‘inhuman,’ ‘pre-subjective,’ ‘visceral’ forces and intensities that influence our thinking and judgments but are separate from these. Whatever else may be meant by the terms affect and emotion … the affects must be non-cognitive, corporeal processes or states” (437).7 For such theorists, affect is, as Brian Massumi (2002) asserts, “irreducibly bodily and autonomic” (28). Other enthusiastic contributors to affect theory from a wide range of fields, include Eve Sedgwick, Patricia Clough, Lauren Berlant, Elizabeth Grosz, Rosie Braidotti, Kathleen Stewart, Lawrence Grossberg, Elizabeth Wilson, and Antonio Damasio.8 This work relates directly to the theme of potentiality. Massumi, one of the most widely read writers on affect theory, stresses its connection with “potential” in a chapter called “Autonomy of Affect.” Something that happens too quickly to have happened, actually, is virtual. The body is as immediately virtual as it is actual. The virtual, the pressing crowd of incipiencies and tendencies, is a realm of potential. In potential is where futurity combines, unmediated, with pastness, where outsides are infolded and sadness is happy (happy because the press to action and expression is life). (Massumi 2002:30–31; italics in original) The definition Massumi gives to the concept of potential here seems to be “unlimited.” In particular, the affective realm is not limited by what he sees as the constraints of sociolinguistic meaning. What motivates these scholars? They do not all agree on every point, and I will be glossing over their differences here, but Leys identifies some common motivations. Centrally, they claim that the role of reason and rationality in politics, ethics, and aesthetics has been overvalued. It is too disembodied and “unlayered” an account of the way people actually form opinions (Leys 2011:436). Given this, they adopt the position that humans are corporeal creatures with important subliminal affective intensities and resonances that are decisive in the way we form opinions and beliefs. They share an insistence that we ignore affects at our peril because they can be manipulated deliberately and because they contain the potential for creativity and transformation. In sum, the affects are independent of and before language. They are before “intentions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs”; they are “non-signifying, autonomic processes that take place below the level of conscious awareness and meaning”; they are “‘inhuman,’ ‘pre-subjective,’ ‘visceral’ forces that influence our thinking and judgments” even though they are noncognitive and corporeal (Leys 2011:437, 443). Among the affects, at the physiological level, categories that are cognitively separate (such as sad or pleasant) get connected, and this is one way the affects are thought to open up new and creative potential (Massumi 2002:29). Massumi—following Deleuze—considers that the affects are characterized by “intensity” rather than content. Affective states, characterized by intensity, are nonsemantic, nonlinear, autonomous, vital, singular, indeterminate, and disruptive of fixed (conventional) meanings. Hence the affects provide a rich reservoir of unpredictable potentiality. All this means there is a gap between the signifying order (content, meaning, convention) and the affective order. What exactly is the gap? According to Leys (2011), there is “a constitutive disjunction between our emotions on the one hand and our knowledge of what causes and maintains them on the other, because … affect and cognition are two separate systems” (437). These theorists generally argue that affect is independent of meaning and signification; they deny the role of intentionality and meaning at the affective level (Leys 2011:450). There is a gap or “radical dichotomy between the ‘real’ causes of affect and the individual’s own interpretation of these causes” (Tomkins, quoted in Leys 2011:437). In Tomkins’s view, affects are “phylogenetically old, automatic responses of the organism that have evolved for survival purposes and lack the cognitive characteristics of the higher-order mental processes and are separate from them” (Leys 2011:437). The affects are located subcortically in the brain, in the part of the brain that processes universal, natural kinds (such as the so-called basic emotions). The “basic emotions” or “affect programs” are genetically hardwired responses, products of human evolution, that are expressed in autonomic behavioral patterns (such as characteristic facial expressions for fear or disgust) (Damasio 1994; Leys 2011:438–439; Sedgwick 2003). There is one part of affect theory that relates directly to the theme of potentiality. This is the supposition that there is no way to include both mind and body in an account of meaning, making it necessary to posit a level below the gap where bodily aspects of affect go on; it is the unformed, precognitive aspects of the lower level of the affects that make them seem filled with potential. This move separates intentionality or meaning from affect and assumes that intentionality and meaning are purely mental or cognitive. There are many points at which this argument can be criticized.9 Some critics have shown in detail how the psychological evidence that is the basis for the tenets of affect theory is questionable and out of date (Leys 2010). Others have detailed the ways affect theorists sometimes misread biological and psychological research (Papoulias and Callard 2010). For example, in a 1985 experiment by Benjamin Libet, subjects were asked to decide to flex a finger at will and to note the exact time they made the decision. The experimenters also measured the exact time of any rise in the subject’s brain activity and the exact time of the subject’s finger flexing. The results showed that there was a 0.2-second delay between the brain’s activity spike and the subject’s decision, then a 0.3-second delay between the subject’s decision and his finger flexing. In all, there seemed to be a half-second delay between the subject’s brain’s initial activity and the subject’s finger actually flexing (Libet 1985). This half-second gap provides Massumi (2002:29) with the evidence of a gap between (lower) brain activity and (higher) decision, intentionality and action. He concludes that material processes of the brain generate our thoughts; conscious thoughts, decisions, and intentions come too late to be very significant. At most they are reflections after the fact. No one would doubt that the brain is necessary for thought and action. But Massumi and other affect theorists place too much weight on this experimental evidence. Other studies have shown that Libet’s evidence is open to contrary interpretations from its publication in 1985 up until the present (Banks and Isham 2009, 2010; Gomes 1998). At the very least, before drawing such far-reaching conclusions, one would hope scholars of cultural phenomena would consider the experimental structures that generate psychological data. As I noted earlier, the psychological subject becomes a particular kind of stripped down entity, a data-emitting being whose subjective experience is outside the frame of the experiment. Perhaps this is not the most adequate model for understanding human intentionality. The mistakes and confusions in this position are laid bare by the approach pioneered in the Cambridge Expedition and later pursued in Wittgenstein’s account of intention, remembering, and other psychological terms. That account argues that our criteria for whether they have happened are normative and conventional. These criteria are located in use, not in the interior psyche. Saying that criteria for meaning are normative and conventional does not mean that everyone must agree, that there is harmony, or that there is not conflict or change. It means that criteria for meaning cannot arise from the mind of a single, isolated individual or from a primitive part of the brain. Drawing on Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Anscombe argued for a social account of intentional actions. Anscombe was arguing against the common-sense view of an intention as composed of an action plus an interior mental state. Looking at the ways we speak of an action as done “intentionally,” she concluded that “intention” in everyday language means something done as an action of a whole person, a moral agent, “under a description.” The relevant description would include the past and present social contexts relevant to the person as much as his or her interior states (Anscombe 1957). What is at stake is whether we understand intentional human action as gaining its meaning in an interior, hidden, and thus socially inaccessible space instead of in the light of social experience. Anscombe worked in a Wittgensteinian mode to move intentionality away from the private interiority of the mind into the space of social interaction, where meaning in language is constituted. Wittgenstein conveyed this message through many homely examples: I tell someone: “I’m going to whistle you the theme …” It is my intention to whistle it, and I already know what I am going to whistle. It is my intention to whistle this theme: have I then already, in some sense, whistled it in thought? (Wittgenstein 1967:2e) One would like to ask: “Would someone who could look into your mind have been able to see that you meant to say that?” Suppose I had written my intention down on a slip of paper, then someone else could have read it there. And can I imagine that he might in some way have found it out more surely than that? Certainly not. (Wittgenstein 1967:8e; italics in original) The point is that intentionality emerges from the whole structure of events from the inception of the notion to the execution of the action. We decide whether someone had a certain intention not by referring to an event or template in the mind but by whether his or her gestures, postures, words, and actions fit with a socially defined notion of being about to whistle a tune or meaning to say something. Sometimes a mental event (whistling the tune or saying the words in one’s head) might precede the action and sometimes not, but in any case, that interior event could not constitute a usable criterion for whether someone was intending to whistle or meaning to speak. Removing any interest in intentionality—conceived as a social process, as affect theory does—removes socially produced contexts of use as a necessary and sufficient basis for what actions and words mean to people. Tackling mathematics, the realm of symbolic life perhaps most difficult to regard as contingent on social norms, Wittgenstein commented that people found the idea that numbers rested on conventional social understandings “unbearable” (Rhees 1970). Why is there resistance to allowing the meaning of human acts to rest on social understandings all the way down? Why such an idea is unbearable returns us to the Cambridge Expedition. Rivers and the others thought that plunging into a different social and physical environment would make them different people, comparable in many ways to the islanders. In this view there is a vast reservoir of potential for change and creative adaption. But this view also entails that there are limits to human experience set by whatever social contexts are relevant. It does not compare with Massumi’s (2002) virtual realm, the “pressing crowd of incipiencies and tendencies” (30). Perhaps it is any limitation that seems unbearable in the present era, where the drumbeat of the necessity for constant growth is heard and felt everywhere. Saying that social context limits what is relevant does not close off experiences that are unconscious, inchoate, or unspeakable. Anthropologists and sociolinguists have long found ways to address the entirely social meanings of things that are repressed from speech or action but nonetheless contain powerful kinds of potentiality. Years ago Gayle Rubin (1975) analyzed the “sex/gender system” as a “set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity” (159). More recently, in Brainstorm, Jordan-Young (2010) rephrases this: “Gender … is a social effect, rather than the result of human biology. Sex in this regard is conceived as the remainder—the material body, and those bodily interactions that are necessary to reproduce it” (13). Borrowing from this way of putting it, we could say that like the sex/gender system, the affect/intentionality system is a set of arrangements by which a society transforms neurological processes into products of human activity. Affects are a social effect rather than the result of human biology. Intentions in this regard are conceived as the remainder—the material brain and those neurological interactions that are necessary to reproduce it.

#### 7 – Bifo’s the ultimate example of feel good politics that just enables wage slavery and exploitation – only collective action to challenge de-regulation can solve

Giovanni Vimercati, 12-13-17, contributor to the Brooklyn Rail. "Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi’s Futurability: The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility," Brooklyn Rail, <https://brooklynrail.org/2017/12/books/Franco-Bifo-Berardis-The-Age-of-Impotence-and-the-Horizon-of-Possibility> --rubaie

Bifo remains predictably vague when it comes to concretely suggesting a possible way out, and it would be naïve and possibly even dangerous to expect otherwise. If we are to ever survive the end of capitalism, it won’t be thanks to a magic formula readily laid out in a book, and certainly not by someone who spent his life advocating the joy of collective action against the sadness of individual indifference. Bifo sees the “emancipation of knowledge from capital accumulation” as the key to the liberation of everyday life. What cognitive workers need, according to him, is “a technical platform for autonomous cooperation” in order to “dismantle and re-programme the machine.” Left out from the emancipatory equation, though, are the millions of neo-slaves, be they Chinese factory workers, Uber drivers, undocumented migrant laborers, or eastern European prostitutes. Are we sure that general intellect alone can emancipate workers, not only cognitive ones, from the increasingly medieval conditions that are being forced upon them? Unlike accelerationist enthusiasts, Bifo knows and stresses the fact that automation and the consequent reduction of manual jobs does not automatically mean liberation from wage slavery. Quite the contrary, the paradox of automation under capitalism is that “it blackmails workers to work faster in exchange for less and less money in an impossible race against robots.” As outdated and antiquated as it may sound, perhaps workers’ struggles, made almost impossible by the violent deregulation of the job market, remain the cardinal juncture through which a future without exploitation, or at least less of it, has to go. That said, Bifo’s central intuition about the centrality of bodies, radical generosity, and affection is indeed precious—though maybe preliminary. To share, disinterestedly, whatever little we have left, both materially and emotionally, is indeed the toughest challenge ahead of us.

### AT: Endless War Impact

#### No endless intervention

Joe **Barnes 15**, Bonner Means Baker Fellow, Rice University’s Baker Institute For Public Policy; and Andrew Bowen, Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies, Center for the National Interest, 2015, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy in the Middle East,” https://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/0b23aade/CME-Pub-StrategyMiddleEast-061915.pdf

We may argue about the wisdom of invading Iraq in the first place. We can enter into what is now an extensive debate upon the success or failure of the 2007 “surge” or the advisability of withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq in 2010. But the **bottom line** remains: the experience of the Iraq invasion is a cautionary tale about the limits of U.S. power— however immense—to remake fractured polities. Afghanistan, where the U.S. has been fighting for 13 years without a conclusive victory over the Taliban, is another case in point. One might contend that the U.S. response to such failures should be to increase the human and financial resources it commits to “victory,” however defined: more troops, more budgetary outlays, permanent stationing of significant numbers of U.S. troops in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Putting aside the question of whether such a response would merely mire the U.S. even more deeply in never-ending conflict, there is **little evidence** that **the American public would support such a policy**. U.S. power is not just limited by its ability to shape developments on the ground; it is also limited by the necessity of creating and, more importantly, **sustaining domestic support** for costly foreign military ventures. Finally, there are **real financial limits to U.S. freedom of action**. After all, the U.S. already spends immense sums on defense; a major new military intervention would further increase the cost. The public might accept substantially higher taxes, sharply reduced expenditures, or the acquisition of even greater debt in a true national emergency. But there is **little taste to do so**, for the sake of yet another large-scale intervention in Iraq.

### AT: Bifo

#### Empirics disprove Bifo’s argument—there has never been a sustained decline in capitalism—300 years of history proves capitalism always bounces back and adapts

#### Their solution to the problem of neoliberalism is too limited, recreates the problems of capital, and cedes the political–collective contestation within the state is the only way to ensure wealth distribution among everyone

Lear 12 (Ben, Shift editor, researcher, “ Lifeboat Communism – A Review of Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s After the Future” May 18, 2012 https://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/)//kyan

What does the end of the future mean for rad­i­cal pol­i­tics? It is at this point that Bifo’s argu­ment becomes prob­lem­atic. In an argu­ment that inter­sects with groups such as Tiqqun, Bifo argues that we must see “Com­mu­nism as a neces­sity in the col­lapse of cap­i­tal.” Dis­tant from the vol­un­tarism of pre­vi­ous forms of Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics, this “post-growth Com­mu­nism” will be best under­stood as a nec­es­sary response to capital’s refusal of labour. Cut adrift from the “oppor­tu­nity” to work, with wel­fare sys­tems dis­man­tled, Bifo argues that we will wit­ness the pro­lif­er­a­tion of zones of auton­omy respond­ing to the needs of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and super­flu­ous social body. Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics will emerge from an exo­dus, both vol­un­tary and com­pul­sory, from a stag­nat­ing and increas­ingly preda­tory state-capital nexus. This exo­dus is both social, in the devel­op­ment of an alter­na­tive infra­struc­ture, and per­sonal, in the with­drawal from the hyper-stimulation of the semi­otic econ­omy. Bifo aban­dons hope in col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion at the level of the political. Bifo’s pol­i­tics could be described as a kind of “lifeboat com­mu­nism.” As the cri­sis rip­ples, mutates, and deep­ens, Bifo sees the role of com­mu­nism as the cre­ation of spaces of sol­i­dar­ity to blunt the worst effects of the cri­sis of social repro­duc­tion. Gone is the demand for a bet­ter world for all, the lib­er­a­tion of our col­lec­tive social wealth, or the unlock­ing of the social poten­tials of tech­nol­ogy. Rather, Bifo’s pol­i­tics are based around insu­lat­ing a nec­es­sar­ily small por­tion of soci­ety from the dic­tates of cap­i­tal. By with­draw­ing from the polit­i­cal sphere, we accept the like­li­hood of los­ing the final scraps of the wel­fare state and con­cede the ter­rain of the polit­i­cal to zom­bie pol­i­tics and preda­tory cap­i­tal. Rather than seek­ing new forms of orga­ni­za­tion to re-enter the polit­i­cal stage, Bifo seems to sug­gest that we seek shel­ter beneath it as best we can. This shy­ing away from the polit­i­cal stage is the weak­ness at the heart of the book. Recent erup­tions of polit­i­cal strug­gle have cap­tured the col­lec­tive imag­i­na­tion because they demon­strate that polit­i­cal con­tes­ta­tion is still pos­si­ble today, in spite of the obsta­cles Bifo has described. The Occupy move­ment and the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and North Africa have res­onated with all those who still have hope in col­lec­tive strug­gle. Although these move­ments have encoun­tered vary­ing prob­lems, to which we must develop solu­tions, they dis­pel the idea of an unchange­able present. The cur­rent block­ages to suc­cess­ful organ­is­ing have been shown to be strate­gic and tac­ti­cal, not ter­mi­nal. Mis­di­ag­nos­ing the cur­rent iner­tia of post-political pub­lic life as a ter­mi­nal con­di­tion leads the left towards an evac­u­a­tion of the polit­i­cal, while we should instead reassert its pri­macy. If we aban­don any hope of fight­ing in, against, and beyond the exist­ing archi­tec­ture of the state and cap­i­tal, and instead seek refuge in small com­munes, and go-slow prac­tices, we aban­don all real hope of a gen­er­al­ized, or gen­er­al­iz­able, eman­ci­pa­tory pol­i­tics. Although Bifo’s analy­sis of the dif­fi­cul­ties of col­lec­tive action res­onates with all of us who have attempted to orga­nize strug­gles in the past few decades, the pro­posal for a sim­ple with­drawal from cap­i­tal­ism is a bleak pol­i­tics indeed – which, at its most opti­mistic, calls for an orderly default by por­tions of the pro­le­tariat. The hori­zons of com­mu­nist pol­i­tics appear much nar­rower when cap­i­tal­ism is no longer seen as the repos­i­tory of a vast store of social wealth await­ing col­lec­tive redis­tri­b­u­tion, but rather rede­fined as an unas­sail­able site of uni­ver­sal and per­ma­nent aus­ter­ity com­bined with widen­ing social redundancy. It is hard to imag­ine a net­work of self-organized projects and sys­tems sup­port­ing the major­ity of the pop­u­la­tion in the con­text of an increas­ingly preda­tory cap­i­tal­ism. Emerg­ing from the and iso­lated left­ist scenes, this lifeboat com­mu­nism will by its very nature have a lim­ited car­ry­ing capac­ity, as the anar­chist expe­ri­ence in post-Katrina New Orleans attests. The lifeboats that Bifo calls for will undoubt­edly be too small and makeshift to har­bor us all. The cri­sis is twofold. It is a cri­sis of cap­i­tal­ist prof­itabil­ity, and of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and sur­plus global pro­le­tariat whose repro­duc­tion (as both labour and body) is under threat. It is unlikely that the pro­lif­er­a­tion of com­munes, squats, food co-ops, file shar­ers, urban gar­den­ers, and vol­un­tary health ser­vices will bring forth a new, bet­ter world. But while the cur­rent seem­ingly post-political sit­u­a­tion throws up mas­sive obsta­cles to orga­niz­ing, there is still a poten­tial for col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion. The cap­i­tal­ist state, racked by its own legit­i­macy cri­sis and weekly polit­i­cal scan­dals, is more vul­ner­a­ble than it appears. We need only recall the period of unex­pected hope built by stu­dents in Britain, occu­piers in Oak­land, and vast swathes of North Africa and the Mid­dle East dur­ing the past two years. These move­ments were mobilised through the betrayal of a vision of the future – but along­side their rage, they put forth a hope which can guide our politics. The task at hand is to unlearn old behav­iour and to forge new tac­ti­cal and organ­i­sa­tional weapons for strug­gle. Bifo’s con­tri­bu­tion is a timely and chal­leng­ing one, but it ulti­mately leads us back towards a DIY cul­ture and “out­reach” pol­i­tics. As our move­ments come to terms with these lim­its, we must also hold onto the belief that lux­ury for all is pos­si­ble. The social poten­tial of unfilled blocks of flats, emerg­ing tech­nolo­gies like [3D-printing](http://www.open-designism.com/profiles/blogs/finally-it-has-happened-the-pirate-bay-goes-product-bay), and the desires of the mil­lions of under­em­ployed, should remind us of this. This will not be pos­si­ble with­out a col­lec­tive strug­gle against the state and the demands of cap­i­tal, one which simul­ta­ne­ously defends what we have and attempts to move beyond it. A retreat to lifeboat pol­i­tics is both pre­ma­ture and a self-fulfilling prophecy. While Bifo cor­rectly analy­ses the cur­rent con­junc­ture – clearly iden­ti­fy­ing the post-political state, the weak­ness of the Left, the cri­sis of prof­itabil­ity and new forms of labour, and their impact on the sub­ject – his polit­i­cal pre­scrip­tions lead us in the wrong direc­tion. Just as Bifo does, we place the strug­gle against work at the cen­ter; but we can also seek to lib­er­ate social wealth, rather than insu­late a lucky few from the rav­ages of cap­i­tal. Rather than “No Future,” we must raise a dif­fer­ent ban­ner: “The future’s here, it just needs reorganizing.”

### Turn

#### Cap is sustainable, inevitable, and key to solve the environmental crisis – alternatives fail and ensure environmental collapse

-at: timeframe, thermodynamics, rebound effects

Bosch and Schmidt 19 (Stephan, Institute of Geography, Chair for Human Geography, University of Augsburg, and Matthias, Institute of Geography, Chair for Human Geography, University of Augsburg, “Is the post-fossil era necessarily post-capitalistic? – The robustness and capabilities of green capitalism”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 161, July) DB

Concerning the second dimension of criticism, Section 4 illustrates how the rejection of green capitalism overlooks promising approaches to surmounting the environmental crisis. On the one hand, we argue that in face of the given narrow time slot as well as the prevailing political strategies, it is more realistic and pragmatic to primarily assess the efficiency of market-oriented solutions. Even though in principle we take sufficiency to have the best effectiveness regarding the solution of ecological and social problems, we still do not count on people's willingness to live in greater moderation within due time. On the other hand, we therefore presume that there are no other suitable economic frame conditions for surmounting the crisis than those offered by the capitalist social order. This perspective is based on the assumption that innovations, which above all emanate from thriving economies (Wangler, 2013), are highly relevant for overcoming the environmental crisis. As growth, innovation, and the development of new industries are to be seen as directly related to the export sector as well as the utilisation of comparative advantages (Bathelt and Glückler, 2012), we therefore also strictly object to the concept of autonomy. Moreover, we take innovation and the aspects of growth, entrepreneurship, and democratic processes of negotiation related to it (cf. Gailing et al., 2013; Walter and Gutscher, 2013; Raven et al., 2016), to be essential for the implementation of regenerative energy systems and social welfare (Iversen, 2005; Nasirov et al., 2017). Our presumption that innovations occur more likely and more frequently within a capitalist, than in alternative social orders (e.g. Harris, 2013: socialist markets), is derived from Schumpeter's notion of competitive capitalism, which he distinctly sets apart from trustified capitalism. Competitive capitalism is about fertile destructive impulses emanating from enthusiastic entrepreneurs who are ready to take risks, and act solution-oriented. These impulses may revolutionise the economic process: “This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism” (Schumpeter, 2009). Based on Schumpeter's ‘theory of economic development’ (cf. Herzog and Honneth, 2016; Schumpeter, 1994; Schumpeter, 2009) – which, according to Marques (2008), represents the original idea of innovation-driven capitalism – we analyse capitalism's robustness to the downfall of fossil energy; moreover, we investigate its potential contributions to ecologic sustainability. Yet we want to go beyond Schumpeter's perspective, which fixes on the entrepreneur, and take a closer look at the role of state policy in Section 5. Our argument is that creative entrepreneurs and markets alone will not suffice to specifically and quickly initiate the change of the energy system driven by innovation. We state the thesis that an active role of the state is needed which relies on political continuity when it comes to promoting environmental innovation and creates stable institutional frame conditions. In a last step, we will show that during the deployment of regenerative energy systems, social aspects have hitherto been given too little attention by actors of state and politics and that national objectives were uncoupled from local contexts. To achieve a successful low-carbon transition, these deficits need to be corrected. In principle, this seems possible, as market-economically oriented regenerative energy systems have often been the result of open-minded democratic negotiations. In Section 6, the findings of the study will be summarised. 2. The crisis of fossil energies and capitalism Energy sources are a central element of humankind's materialistic history and elementary changes in the relevance of energy carriers have always led to extensive economic and societal transformations (Bridge et al., 2013). Exemplarily, the drastic increase in productivity during industrialisation cannot be explained without the revolutionary change of the energy system towards fossil fuels (Osterhammel, 2011). Ever since, economic growth is accompanied by an increasing consumption of finite energy resources and non-energetic primary materials (Altvater, 2005). Accordingly, questions of economic development must always be regarded in the context of the energy system, as well as the circulation of energetic and non-energetic crude materials within it (Meadows et al., 2004). Altvater (2007) takes the relationship between humans and nature to be crisis-laden because a limited stock of energy resources within the Earth's thin crust forms the basis of the present economic system. This limitation implied grave consequences for the global ecology. The apparently crisis-laden interrelation of nature and economy is also highlighted in ‘Anthropocene or Capitolocene?’ edited by Moore (2016), in which the impacts of capitalism are regarded as significant enough to be marked as their own geochronological era. The main point of criticism is capitalism's orientation to industrial scaling and quantitative growth (Mathews, 2011), which likely will end abruptly once Earth's limited capacities will have been depleted by the exponential growth of population and economy (Daly, 1995). Yet not only the finiteness of energy carriers, but also the accumulation of extreme meteorological incidents, mass mortality of species, and sea level rise represent impediments of stable economic growth (McCarthy, 2015). The scenarios concerning trends of the world's condition developed by the Club of Rome illustrate that keeping a high wealth level can only be accomplished if a radical change in societal attitude concerning the valuation of growth will take effect (Meadows et al., 2004). Stopping environmental destruction while maintaining the present economic system appears to be impossible, since fossil energy carriers provide globally acting companies with the opportunity to spatially separate production and consumption as well as to externalise the manifold ecological expenses (Chisholm, 1990). Bridge (2010) rates the heated debates about Peak Oil as ecologically motivated forebodings of a new energy order in which the modern industrial nations are going to free themselves of their dependence on oil. For Neomarxist groups, the end of the age of mineral oil even represents an apocalyptic turn of eras during which nature were going to take vengeance on the ecological arrogance of capitalism. According to Bettini and Karaliotas (2013), the narration of Peak Oil thereby attains a symbolism that reaches far beyond mathematical calculations of the scarcity of fossil energy sources, being extended to a general criticism of a system that is exclusively oriented on growth. McCarthy (2015) sees the chance of a post-fossil capitalism especially in the commodification of wind, sunlight, geothermal heat, and waves. This way, nature would again be introduced into the cycle of capital. Van den Bergh (2011) presumes that this may be a practicable approach, perceiving criticism of market economy and capitalism as too radical and warns of one-sidedly problematising growth without simultaneously pointing out realisable alternative ways. He therefore prefers the ‘a-growth-concept’, which assumes a neutral position on growth, trying to create social as well as ecological sustainability by means of pricing policy, environmental agreements, and education initiatives. The commodification of nature, however, is rejected by the degrowth movement, as the comparison of the Montreal Protocol, which is based on regulations (ozone) with the Kyoto Protocol based on trade had shown a greater effectiveness of regulative measures (Kallis, 2011). Concerning the market's capabilities, North (2010) additionally speaks of the neoliberal enthusiasts' mindless faith in technology, who were mistakenly convinced that creative destruction is sufficient to face the societal challenges posed by Peak Oil and the climate crisis. Sarkar and Kern (2008) limit the possibilities of the global community's further development to the two options ‘eco socialism’ or ‘barbarism’. This rhetoric stylises capitalism as the image of the enemy: on the one hand, it represents the cause of the global ecological crisis due to the exploitation of natural resources – and for that reason alone were not to be maintained (Daly, 2005) – while on the other hand not offering a suitable social framework for mastering the crisis (Kallis et al., 2009). Hence, the development of a symbiotic economy (Garcia-Olivares and Sole, 2015) rooted beyond obsessive economic growth (Buch-Hansen, 2018) is promoted. Renewable energies were apt to meet these requirements since they can be developed through collaborative bottom-up mechanisms on a communal level, therefore enabling the decentralisation and democratisation of energy supply (Rifkin, 2013). In fact, this may be an option. However, in the following, we want to demonstrate that capitalism is not only very robust to crises, but is also able to contribute to the solution of the environmental crisis. 3. Robustness of capitalism 3.1. Space-time compression We will now show that the possibility of increasing productivity does not end with the transition to a regenerative energy system, but only needs to be embedded into new logistic-infrastructural contexts. In this, we contradict Altvater (2007), Huber (2009) and North (2010), who claim that capitalism could expand only on the basis of fossil fuels, since, due to the global transportability of oil, gas, and coal, entrepreneurial actions are no longer bound to the local availability of energy resources, but range globally. Furthermore, the usage of fossil energy carriers is not subject to daily or seasonal fluctuations. Transportability and baseload capacity hence lead to space-time compression (Harvey, 1996), as products can be generated in ever shorter intervals of time. Following this logic, the limitation of the fossil resource basis inevitably brings about the end of the capitalistic system. It remains undisputed that energy flow within a solar-based energy system is hard to control (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). Most forms of renewable energies are intermittent sources, whose contribution to the energy mix are subject to the rhythms of sun, wind, precipitation, and tides (Fares, 2015). Adapting energy production to demand, a fundamental prerequisite of continuous economic growth, thus becomes a major challenge. What Altvater (2007), Huber (2009) and North (2010) actually do not include in their considerations, are the numerous technological innovations for the stabilisation of regenerative energy systems. After all, with biomass and geothermal power, two energy carriers capable of providing base load are at hand (Matek and Gawell, 2015), which may, in the form of regenerative combined power plants, support the weather-dependent energy sources sun and wind (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011; Ramchurn et al., 2011). The numerous energy storage technologies are also important, albeit only few of these have reached industrial maturity. In principle, mechanical, chemical, electrical, or thermal kinds of storage are being discerned (Hadjipaschalis et al., 2009). Compressed air and pumped storage power plants with efficiency levels of up to 80% are especially promising (Anagnostopoulos and Papantonis, 2008). Research is also conducted on the conversion of surplus regenerative power into methane or hydrogen (Jensen et al., 2007), by which the bidirectional operation of the power and gas network is made possible, allowing for transportability as well as baseload capacity within large spatial units. Space-time availability may also be augmented by the development and capacity expansion of high-voltage transmission lines (Walter and Bosch, 2013). Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) have pointed out at an early point, that the existent grids, having been developed following a monopolistic logic, are outdated and incapable of integrating decentrally-produced electricity with strong fluctuations. These deficits, however, are successively being corrected. E.g., Germany's South, which is poor in wind but strong in terms of industry is being provided with direct access to the big wind energy off-shore potentials in the North as well as to the storage power plants in Scandinavia (cf. Fig. 1). The possibilities of intercontinental power transport from regenerative sources have been thoroughly investigated by DLR (2006) and Grossmann et al. (2014). Both energy storage and the development of the power grid thus will successively reverse the present space-time limitations of regenerative energy systems. The two domains, however, are not isolated from one another, but are coordinated via smart grids. Solomon and Krishna (2011) emphasise that smart grids are superbly suitable for the implementation of market-based approaches, so that an innovation-driven mass market for energy efficiency technologies could be anticipated. Smart grids also provide the possibility of no longer designing the mass production of renewable energy technologies on a fossil basis, but by the usage of renewable energy. While the production of the first generation of regenerative technologies was based on fossil energy, in future, the possibilities of energy storage, the almost unlimited energy potential of a solar-based economy, and the combination of both aspects through smart grids will ensure the flexible provision of regenerative energy at every production site without limits of time. Yet in order to optimise the flows of energy and material in smart grids, concepts of closed crude material cycles are needed, which, in the sense of the cradle-to-cradle approach (cf. Section 4), allow the reintroduction of used materials (e.g. old wind power plants made of renewable resources) to the biosphere. Thus, the problem of externalisation of ecological costs can be minimised. Summing up, the increase of productivity and stable economic growth within regenerative energy systems seems possible. Still, it remains to be emphasised that large-scale energy projects also entail negative social consequences. E.g., Yenneti et al. (2016) have shown that the Charanka solar park in Gujarat, India, was erected on areas that the local population's livelihood had depended on for decades. The refuse of access to these areas, as well as the inhabitants' successive dispossession through state measures thus are direct results of the Indian economy's ecological modernisation (Levien, 2013). In this context, Baka (2013) speaks of “energy dispossessions”, a phenomenon which has also been observed with large-scale wind energy parks (Avila, 2018; Cowell, 2010). The socio-material impact of economic modernisation on the local population, whose lives strongly depend on agricultural land use, are often insufficiently respected (Yenneti et al., 2016), so that the dubious impression was given that environmental protection and economic growth based on efficient technologies, competition, and state measures could go with one another without social side effects. Remarkably, the controversial energy mega-projects especially in the global South, are not the cause of the development of new power asymmetries and conflicts, but rather reproduce and harden long-standing social disparities and injustices (Avila, 2018). According to Bradley and Hedrén (2014), a low-carbon transition hence misses its aims if it is only about modernising the energy system without likewise transforming the underlying social structures. 3.2. Crisis as an element of capitalist social order We hold the view that the occurrence of crises in capitalism is not due to it being an ailing, doomed economic order; nor is it a proof of capitalism's ineptitude for meeting ecological challenges. Instead, we deem that crisis is a fundamental element of the capitalist social order that actually provides a chance for readjusting economic processes. Harvey (2011) explains that anything blocking the circulation and accumulation of capital may pose a threat to the capitalist system and induce a fundamental crisis. The finiteness of fossil fuels is a crisis of this kind (McCarthy, 2015). Altvater (2007) is convinced that capitalism will not be able to overcome this crisis; therefore, future technologic progress had to be embedded in a non-fossil, non-capitalist framework. Kallis (2011) also emphasises that the approach to a steady state (cf. Daly, 1991, Daly, 2005) will transform the institutional preconditions of property, work, banking, and distribution to such an extent that in the end, it will be impossible to still identify them as capitalistic. With regard to Kallis' doubts concerning the institutional robustness of capitalism, Schumpeter points out that precisely the ups and downs of industrial development, which are the outcomes of successful innovations' intensifying competition, enable progress (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). As crises therefore represent an immanent part of the capitalist system, an environmental and resources-related crisis caused by the capitalistic process does not provide sufficient evidence to suggest a possible downfall of the capitalistic social order. The crisis might even be taken as proof of an economic cycle, if it is regarded as a period of depression between the dwindling fossil and the emerging regenerative age. Böhm et al. (2012) and McCarthy (2015) confirm that capitalism is capable of overcoming even fundamental crises, actually using these as starting points of its further expansion. Concerning the environmental crisis, Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) also concede that the deployment of renewable energies holds the potential of founding a new form of capitalism that is characterised by a much lower degree of materialistic lavishness. Bettini and Karaliotas (2013) emphasise that from a neo-liberal point of view, the accusation of capitalism bringing about a resources-related and environmental crisis does not at all provoke self-doubts. Rather, it caused the profitable marketing of adequate approaches to solutions in the field of resource depletion and environmental impacts to move into economic focus. Even Altvater (2007) points out that the externalised effects of production and consumption on nature become relevant for companies once they jeopardise profitability and accumulation. In that case, environmental problems and their solutions can actually be made part of capitalist logic. Solomon and Krishna (2011) are convinced that in order to solve the environmental crisis, it were not even necessary to achieve further technologic breakthroughs, as the technologies needed for the remodeling of society towards energy efficiency were already mature and cost-efficient. Even if capitalism might be sufficiently robust, Kallis (2011) still takes the crisis as a chance to break up obstructive social and political lock-ins that have hitherto seemed unalterable and have lead into the crisis. Yet he does not regard the ability of social and political transformation to be inherent in the traits of market, but as a characteristic of a social order orientated towards degrowth. Certainly, Kallis is right in saying that the market is hard to control, making a concerted transformation towards sustainability difficult. Still his criticism only refers to that form of capitalism which Schumpeter characterised as trustified capitalism and which does lead to ecologically problematic lock-in effects. The criticism cannot, however, be applied to competitive capitalism, which generates those basic innovations giving rise to the revolutionary crises described as so fertile by Kallis (2011). Thus, an opportunity is provided for alternative social conditions to be brought about – but within the capitalist social order – and for substantiating these new conditions through further innovations. Innovations may emerge outside of competition and market economy, but will then lack the required frequency and force, as growth represents the most important incentive of innovation (Wangler, 2013). On the other hand, a continuous process of innovation again leads to growth, which may revolutionise the present social conditions, as Schumpeter states (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Thereby, a new combination of the given means of production within new sites of production emerges, generating new goods, methods, and markets. Productive resources are applied to hitherto untested usages while being withdrawn from those usages they served before (Geels, 2011). What Kallis (2011) terms technological optimism with regard to the ecological innovative power of capitalism, is therefore technological realism in the context of Schumpeter's competitive capitalism. Without doubt, innovative boosts on the part of already established companies are also conceivable and may give rise to the possibility of maintaining trustified capitalism with its ecologically precarious structures. An example hereof is the innovation ‘Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage’, by which the ecological impact of the emission intensive electrical conversion of coal is being reduced (Benson and Orr, 2008). Technological progress may hence stabilise the existent system of economy and policy that is accountable for the environmental crisis (Bettini and Karaliotas, 2013). In Schumpeter's view, however, the decisive economic order is competitive capitalism, which is characterised by the aggressive economic demeanour of new, innovative enterprises economically challenging the establishment (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). The start-ups of new companies, which are inseparably connected with the processes of innovation, withdraw production goods from the present capitalist system by underbidding, disturbing the former economic balance that is so destructive for nature. Competition is therefore essential for overcoming the environmental crisis. In that respect, the concept of ‘solidary economics’ and its precept of surmounting the allegedly ruthless principle of competition and emancipating oneself from the logic of the markets (Embshoff and Giegold, 2008), is counterproductive, as the renunciation of competition impedes the breakup of crusted economic structures, which thus continue to harm the environment. After all, the big energy providers' strategy was and is to hold on to the fossil-nuclear power plant pool for as long as possible, suppressing alternative concepts of energy supply (Gawel et al., 2012). A radical transformation of the energy system therefore cannot emerge from the existent structures, as Schumpeter assesses (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Instead, innovative processes emerge outside of the old major companies until proceeding to attack the incumbent regime through the rededication of means of production (Geels, 2011). Innovative marketing strategies of small and middle scale businesses supplanting cumbersome large companies play an essential part especially in the field of renewable energies (Walsh, 2012). In this, competition is a decisive element that cannot easily be superseded. 4. Capabilities of green capitalism A competitive green capitalism develops great creativity by its high rate of innovation, which may also reinvent the relationship between humans and nature. We now want to exemplify how this might be brought about. Schumpeter holds the view that innovation is the result of the capitalistic entrepreneurial spirit, not the other way round (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Technological and social progress hence are no independent variables materialising out of thin air, but arise from the logic of the capitalist process. Meadows et al. (2004) accept that innovations may relocate the limits of growth, making it possible to maintain the living standard by continuously reducing the consumption of crude materials and energy. However, one of the energy system's prevailing deficits is that depleted or not yet tapped resources are being (re-)obtained based on non-regenerative energy (Schwartzman, 2008), causing capitalistic production to be increasingly energetically inefficient (Murphy and Hall, 2011). Overcoming the energy crisis hence calls for the consideration of thermodynamic principles (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, Georgescu-Roegen, 1986; Martinez-Alier, 1987). Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) see the deployment of renewable energies as a possibility of limiting the creation of entropy. Kaberger and Mansson (2001) have shown that innovative resources-saving material cycles may be possible and economical if they are based on the usage of the inexhaustible energy of irradiance. What is promising about this approach is that, due to research and development, the utilisation of solar energy becomes more and more efficient and lucrative (Schmid, 2016). Moreover, its inexhaustible potential allows for the exploitation of material resources even from deposits with extremely low crude material density. On a local level, the utilisation of solar energy may actually lead to a reduction of entropy (Ebeling et al., 1998; Kranert and Cord-Landwehr, 2010), as it is the case with the usage of waste heat of solar thermal power plants for the desalination of sea water (DLR, 2007). The integration of these capacities into smart grids and the associated remodeling of every production process to purely regenerative sources have been detailed in Section 3. We further argue that innovation surpasses conceivability. Even Harris (2010) sees a particularly high potential in unpredictable technological innovations to break through economic routine, thus encouraging further entrepreneurs in issuing their own innovations. Capitalism might thereby be provided with the chance to reduce its ecological exploitation. But innovation exceeds strictly technological aspects and may as well comprise social and institutional aspects (Arentsen and Bellekom, 2014). E.g., in the mobility sector, whose pollutant emissions have significantly contributed to the environmental crisis, innovations have led to new features of cargo and passenger transportation. This is illustrated by the example of car sharing as an innovative life style (Prettenthaler and Steininger, 1999) or bicycle-sharing schemes in urban areas (Midgley, 2011). Another representative case is the history of the ozone hole, which Meadows et al. (2004) describe as a history of civil success regarding the correction of a severe overshoot. Quite in the sense of Schumpeter, Meadows et al. (2004) name the ‘industry's creative heads’ as the crucial problem-solving determinant. Through the three innovative boosts ‘better insulation’, ‘reduced toxic substitute materials’, and ‘emission-free alternative substances’, it will be possible to rebuild the original density of the ozone layer by the mid-21st century. Remarkably, this is realised without abandoning the existent economic system. Furthermore, we argue that it is realistic to assume growth-oriented, competitive markets in the future, rather than socio-material conditions beyond them, which, as stated by Van den Bergh (2011) are completely uncertain as of now (e.g. Harris, 2013: socialist markets). We therefore hold the view that it is more pragmatic to design future mass markets in an eco-friendly way. Kallis (2011) rejects the possibility that the wonder of a dematerialised economy might occur, as improvements of efficiency were overcompensated by growing consumption. While dematerialisation may be tantamount to a wonder, researchers still do put effort into adjusting the materialised economy to ecological compatibility. One aspect is the thorough redefinition of nature protection, because nowadays, nature protection is reduced to the attempt of limiting the harmfulness of processes and products (Mulhall and Braungart, 2010). However, due to the potential creation of new mass markets for more eco-friendly and efficient processes or products, this strategy holds the danger of actually augmenting unwanted effects through rebound effects. In this regard, Alcott (2005) points to the Jevon's Paradox which says it is a great error to think that technologic innovations were going to reduce the consumption of resources. Polimeni et al. (2015) name the example of the Green Revolution: the remarkable increase of food production's area efficiency was not at all able to abate the problems of hunger and area consumption, as consequently, the population greatly increased. Likewise, a mass market of efficient and eco-friendly products would again lead to a massive amount of poison and waste, with disposed crude materials hardly being recycled. The ecological costs then would have to be externalised, which Sturm and Vogt (2011) regard as strong evidence of the failure of the market. The core problem hence lies in the fact that products are being produced exclusively for the technosphere (McDonough and Braungart, 2013). E.g., copper is almost universally applicable to and beneficial for technological systems, while in biological systems, this material is extremely poisonous. Thus, the aim must be to design products in a way that makes them equally usable in biosphere, i.e. subsequent to their technical usage. This calls for the development of a combined management of nutrients for techno- and biosphere. Human ways of living, the processes and products they are based on, may thereby be employed for the benefit of nature. The focus must therefore be put on those innovations that break up the present paradigm of environmental protection by realising products that create a useful material connection between techno- and biosphere. An example of this kind of creative destruction is the Austrian company Gugler, the first print shop worldwide that produces printing products free from harmful ingredients and exclusively with substances that can be biologically recycled (Gugler GmbH, 2018). E.g., the accruing sludge is returned to biosphere and the ash of burned printing products can be reused as a fertilizer. These conditions provide the possibility of designing economic activities to be ecologically compatible despite a high resource throughput.

#### Capitalism is sustainable---recent data proves we’re entering the golden age

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**The** past 30 years have seen immense progress in improving the quality of life for much of humanity. **Extreme** poverty **— the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day —** has fallen by nearly two-thirds, from 1.9 billion to around 650 million**.** Life expectancy has risen **in most of the world,** along with literacy and access to education**,** while infant mortality has fallen**. Despite perceptions to the contrary,** the average person born today is likely to have access to more opportunities and have a better quality of life than at any other point in human history**.** Much of this increase in human wellbeing has been propelled by rapid economic growth driven largely by state-led industrial policy, particularly in poor-to-middle income countries. **However,** this growth has come at a cost**:** between 1990 and 2019**, global** emissions of CO2 increased by 56%.Historically, economic growth has been closely linked to increased energy consumption **— and increased CO2 emissions in particular — leading some to argue that a more prosperous world is one that necessarily has more impacts on our natural environment and climate. There is a lively academic debate about our ability to “absolutely decouple” emissions and growth — that is, the extent to which the adoption of clean energy technology can allow emissions to decline while economic growth continues.** Over the past 15 years, however, something has begun to change. **Rather than a 21st century dominated by coal that energy modelers foresaw,** global coal use peaked in 2013 and is now in structural decline**.** We have succeeded in making clean energy cheap, with solar power and battery storage costs falling 10-fold since 2009**. The world produced more electricity from clean energy —** solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear — than from coal over the past two years**. And, according to some major oil companies,** peak oil is upon us **— not because we have run out of cheap oil to produce, but because** demand is falling and companies expect further decline as consumers increasingly shift to electric vehicles. **The** world has long been experiencing a relative decouplingbetween economic growth and CO2 emissions**,** with the emissions per unit of GDP falling for the past 60 years**.** This is the case even in countries likeIndia and China **that** have been undergoing rapid **economic** growth. **But relative decoupling alone is inadequate in a world where global CO2 emissions need to peak and decline in the next decade to give us any chance at limiting warming to well below 2℃, in line with Paris Agreement targets. Thankfully, there is increasing evidence that** the world is on track to absolutely decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth **— with global** CO2 emissions **potentially having** peaked in 2019and unlikely to increase substantially in the coming decade**. While an emissions peak is just the first and easiest step towards eventually reaching the net-zero emissions required to stop the world from continuing to warm, it** demonstrates that linkages between emissions and economic activity are not an immutable law, but rather simply a result of our current means of energy production. **In recent years we have seen more and more examples of absolute decoupling — economic growth accompanied by falling CO2 emissions.** Since 2005,32 countries with a population of at least one million people have absolutely decoupled **emissions from economic growth, both for terrestrial emissions (those within national borders) and consumption emissions (emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country). This includes the** U**nited** S**tates,** Japan, Mexico, Germany, U**nited** K**ingdom,** France, Spain, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Austria, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Croatia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Cyprus. **Figure 1, below, shows the declines in territorial emissions (blue) and increases in GDP (red). To qualify as having experienced absolute decoupling, we require countries included in this analysis to pass four separate filters: a population of at least one million (to focus the analysis on more representative cases),** declining territorial emissions over the 2005-2019 period (based on a linear regression), declining consumption emissions, and increasing real GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis, using constant 2017 international $USD). **We chose not to include 2020 in this analysis because it is not particularly representative of longer-term trends, and consumption and territorial emissions estimates are not yet available for many countries. There is a wide range of rates of economic growth between 2005-2019 among countries experiencing absolute decoupling. Somewhat counterintuitively, there is no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and the magnitude of emissions reductions within the group.** While it is unlikely that there is not at least some linkage between the two factors, there are plenty of examples of countries (e.g., Singapore, Romania, and Ireland) experiencing both extremely rapid economic growth and large reductions in CO2 emissions. **One of the** primary criticisms of **some prior analyses of absolute** decoupling is **that they ignore** leakage**. Specifically, the offshoring of manufacturing from high-income countries over the past three decades to countries like China has led to “illusory” drops in emissions, where the emissions associated with high-income country consumption are simply shipped overseas and no longer show up in territorial emissions accounting. There is some truth in this critique, as there was a large increase in emissions embodied in imports from developing countries between 1990 and 2005. After 2005, however,** structural changes in China and a growing domestic market led to a reversal of these trends; the amount of emissions “exported” from developed countries to developing countries has actually declined over the past 15 years. **This means that, for many countries,** both territorial emissions and consumption emissions **(which include any emissions “exported” to other countries)** have jointly declined**. In fact, on average, consumption emissions have been declining slightly faster than territorial emissions since 2005 in the 32 countries we identify as experiencing absolute decoupling. Figure 2, below, shows the change in consumption emissions (teal) and GDP (red) between 2005 and 2019. There is a pretty wide variation in the extent to which these countries have reduced their territorial and consumption emissions since 2005. Some countries — such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, and Singapore – have seen territorial emissions fall faster than consumption emissions, while the US, Japan, Germany, and Spain (among others) have seen consumption emissions fall faster. Figure 3 shows reductions in consumption and territorial emissions for each country, with the size of the dot representing the size of the population in 2019.** Absolute decoupling is possible.There is no physical law requiring economic growth — and broader increases in human wellbeing — to necessarily be linked to CO2 emissions**. All of the** services that we rely on today that emit fossil fuels **— electricity, transportation, heating, food —** can **in principle** be replaced by near-zero carbon alternatives**, though these are more mature**

#### Extinction outweighs

Ord ’20 [Toby Ord, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University & world-renowned risk-assessment expert who’s advised the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, the US National Intelligence Council and the UK Prime Minister’s Office. (3-3-2020, “The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity,” Hachette Book Group & Bloomsbury Publishing, <https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Precipice/3aSiDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0>, Google Books]

UNDERSTANDING EXISTENTIAL RISK

Humanity’s future is ripe with possibility. We have achieved a rich understanding of the world we inhabit and a level of health and prosperity of which our ancestors could only dream. We have begun to explore the other worlds in the heavens above us, and to create virtual worlds completely beyond our ancestors’ comprehension. We know of almost no limits to what we might ultimately achieve.

Human extinction would foreclose our future. It would destroy our potential. It would eliminate all possibilities but one: a world ~~bereft~~ [lacking] of human flourishing. Extinction would bring about this failed world and lock it in forever—there would be no coming back.

The philosopher Nick Bostrom showed that extinction is not the only way this could happen: there are other catastrophic outcomes in which we lose not just the present, but all our potential for the future.

Consider a world in ruins: an immense catastrophe has triggered a global collapse of civilization, reducing humanity to a pre-agricultural state. During this catastrophe, the Earth’s environment was damaged so severely that it has become impossible for the survivors to ever reestablish civilization. Even if such a catastrophe did not cause our extinction, it would have a similar effect on our future. The vast realm of futures currently open to us would have collapsed to a narrow range of meager options. We would have a failed world with no way back.

Or consider a world in chains: in a future reminiscent of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, the entire world has become locked under the rule of an oppressive totalitarian regime, determined to perpetuate itself. Through powerful, technologically enabled indoctrination, surveillance and enforcement, it has become impossible for even a handful of dissidents to find each other, let alone stage an uprising. With everyone on Earth living under such rule, the regime is stable from threats, internal and external. If such a regime could be maintained indefinitely, then descent into this totalitarian future would also have much in common with extinction: just a narrow range of terrible futures remaining, and no way out.

[FIGURE 2.1 Omitted]

Following Bostrom, I shall call these “existential catastrophes,” defining them as follows: 3

An existential catastrophe is the destruction of humanity’s longterm potential.

An existential risk is a risk that threatens the destruction of humanity’s longterm potential.

These definitions capture the idea that the outcome of an existential catastrophe is both dismal and irrevocable. We will not just fail to fulfill our potential, but this very potential itself will be permanently lost. While I want to keep the official definitions succinct, there are several areas that warrant clarification.

First, I am understanding humanity’s longterm potential in terms of the set of all possible futures that remain open to us. 4 This is an expansive idea of possibility, including everything that humanity could eventually achieve, even if we have yet to invent the means of achieving it. 5 But it follows that while our choices can lock things in, closing off possibilities, they can’t open up new ones. So any reduction in humanity’s potential should be understood as permanent. The challenge of our time is to preserve our vast potential, and to protect it against the risk of future destruction. The ultimate purpose is to allow our descendants to fulfill our potential, realizing one of the best possible futures open to us.

While it may seem abstract at this scale, this is really a familiar idea that we encounter every day. Consider a child with high longterm potential: with futures open to her in which she leads a great life. It is important that her potential is preserved: that her best futures aren’t cut off due to accident, trauma or lack of education. It is important that her potential is protected: that we build in safeguards to make such a loss of potential extremely unlikely. And it is important that she ultimately fulfills her potential: that she ends up taking one of the best paths open to her. So too for humanity.

Existential risks threaten the destruction of humanity’s potential. This includes cases where this destruction is complete (such as extinction) and where it is nearly complete, such as a permanent collapse of civilization in which the possibility for some very minor types of flourishing remain, or where there remains some remote chance of recovery. 6 I leave the thresholds vague, but it should be understood that in any existential catastrophe the greater part of our potential is gone and very little remains.

Second, my focus on humanity in the definitions is not supposed to exclude considerations of the value of the environment, other animals, successors to Homo sapiens, or creatures elsewhere in the cosmos. It is not that I think only humans count. Instead, it is that humans are the only beings we know of that are responsive to moral reasons and moral argument—the beings who can examine the world and decide to do what is best. If we fail, that upward force, that capacity to push toward what is best or what is just, will vanish from the world.

Our potential is a matter of what humanity can achieve through the combined actions of each and every human. The value of our actions will stem in part from what we do to and for humans, but it will depend on the effects of our actions on non-humans too. If we somehow give rise to new kinds of moral agents in the future, the term “humanity” in my definition should be taken to include them.

My focus on humanity prevents threats to a single country or culture from counting as existential risks. There is a similar term that gets used this way—when people say that something is “an existential threat to this country.” Setting aside the fact that these claims are usually hyperbole, they are expressing a similar idea: that something threatens to permanently destroy the longterm potential of a country or culture.

Third, any notion of risk must involve some kind of probability. What kind is involved in existential risk? Understanding the probability in terms of objective long-run frequencies won’t work, as the existential catastrophes we are concerned with can only ever happen once, and will always be unprecedented until the moment it is too late. We can’t say the probability of an existential catastrophe is precisely zero just because it hasn’t happened yet.

Situations like these require an evidential sense of probability, which describes the appropriate degree of belief we should have on the basis of the available information. This is the familiar type of probability used in courtrooms, banks and betting shops. When I speak of the probability of an existential catastrophe, I will mean the credence humanity should have that it will occur, in light of our best evidence.9

There are many utterly terrible outcomes that do not count as existential catastrophes.

One way this could happen is if there were no single precipitous event, but a multitude of smaller failures. This is because I take on the usual sense of catastrophe as a single, decisive event, rather than any combination of events that is bad in sum. If we were to squander our future simply by continually treating each other badly, or by never getting around to doing anything great, this could be just as bad an outcome but wouldn’t have come about via a catastrophe.

Alternatively, there might be a single catastrophe, but one that leaves open some way for humanity to eventually recover. From our own vantage, looking out to the next few generations, this may appear equally bleak. But a thousand years hence it may be considered just one of several dark episodes in the human story. A true existential catastrophe must by its very nature be the decisive moment of human history—the point where we failed.

Even catastrophes large enough to bring about the global collapse of civilization may fall short of being existential catastrophes. While colloquially referred to as “the end of the world,” a global collapse of civilization need not be the end of the human story. It has the required severity, but may not be permanent or irrevocable.

In this book, I shall use the term civilization collapse quite literally, to refer to an outcome where humanity across the globe loses civilization (at least temporarily), being reduced to a pre-agricultural way of life. The term is often used loosely to refer merely to a massive breakdown of order, the loss of modern technology, or an end to our culture. But I am talking about a world without writing, cities, law, or any of the other trappings of civilization.

This would be a very severe disaster and extremely hard to trigger. For all the historical pressures on civilizations, never once has this happened— not even on the scale of a continent.10 The fact that Europe survived losing 25 to 50 percent of its population in the Black Death, while keeping civilization firmly intact, suggests that triggering the collapse of civilization would require more than 50 percent fatality in every region of the world.11

Even if civilization did collapse, it is likely that it could be reestablished. As we have seen, civilization has already been independently established at least seven times by isolated peoples.12 While one might think resource depletion could make this harder, it is more likely that it has become substantially easier. Most disasters short of human extinction would leave our domesticated animals and plants, as well as copious material resources in the ruins of our cities—it is much easier to re-forge iron from old railings than to smelt it from ore. Even expendable resources such as coal would be much easier to access, via abandoned reserves and mines, than they ever were in the eighteenth century. 13 Moreover, evidence that civilization is possible, and the tools and knowledge to help rebuild, would be scattered across the world.

There are, however, two close connections between the collapse of civilization and existential risk. First, a collapse would count as an existential catastrophe if it were unrecoverable. For example, it is conceivable that some form of extreme climate change or engineered plague might make the planet so inhospitable that humanity would be irrevocably reduced to scattered foragers.14 And second, a global collapse of civilization could increase the chance of extinction, by leaving us more vulnerable to subsequent catastrophe.

One way a collapse could lead to extinction is if the population of the largest remaining group fell below the minimum viable population—the level needed for a population to survive. There is no precise figure for this, as it is usually defined probabilistically and depends on many details of the situation: where the population is, what technology they have access to, the sort of catastrophe they have suffered. Estimates range from hundreds of people up to tens of thousands.15 If a catastrophe directly reduces human population to below these levels, it will be more useful to classify it as a direct extinction event, rather than an unrecoverable collapse. And I expect that this will be one of the more common pathways to extinction.

We rarely think seriously about risks to humanity’s entire potential. We encounter them mostly in action films, where our emotional reactions are dulled by their overuse as an easy way to heighten the drama.16 Or we see them in online lists of “ten ways the world could end,” aimed primarily to thrill and entertain. Since the end of the Cold War, we rarely encounter sober discussions by our leading thinkers on what extinction would mean for us, our cultures or humanity. 17 And so in casual contexts people are sometimes flippant about the prospect of human extinction.

But when a risk is made vivid and credible—when it is clear that billions of lives and all future generations are actually on the line—the importance of protecting humanity’s longterm potential is not, for most people, controversial. If we learned that a large asteroid was heading toward Earth, posing a greater than 10 percent chance of human extinction later this century, there would be little debate about whether to make serious efforts to build a deflection system, or to ignore the issue and run the risk. To the contrary, responding to the threat would immediately become one of the world’s top priorities. Thus our lack of concern about these threats is much more to do with not yet believing that there are such threats, than it is about seriously doubting the immensity of the stakes.

Yet it is important to spend a little while trying to understand more clearly the different sources of this importance. Such an understanding can buttress feeling and inspire action; it can bring to light new considerations; and it can aid in decisions about how to set our priorities.

#### Crisis narratives are wrong – peak growth and absolute decoupling are coming – only crisis causes overconsumption.

Nordhaus 20 – founder and executive director of the Breakthrough Institute. (Ted, “Must Growth Doom the Planet?,” The New Atlantis, Number 61, Winter 2020, pp. 76-86)//gcd

But the solution, such as it is, turns out to be right in front of us. Mainstream economic theory may posit that endless economic growth is desirable and possible, but what most macroeconomists actually fret about today is stagnation. The growth rate of developed economies has been falling for decades. This is due not to biophysical limits to consumption, but rather to the simple mathematical reality that the richer an economy becomes, the more wealth it needs to gain each year to maintain the same growth rate. Economic growth in wealthy post-industrial economies, in other words, appears to be inexorably slowing without the need for eco-austerity.

Each additional increment of growth in advanced economies also typically becomes less material-intensive, as sectors like manufacturing, mining, and refining account for a smaller share of total economic output, and knowledge and service sectors account for a larger share.

Population growth is slowing even faster than economic growth, as fertility rates typically fall as incomes and education rise — a dynamic that has been as robust a feature of global modernity as rising consumption. Japan, now 126 million people, could see its population fall by as much as half, to less than 60 million by 2100. The European Union, currently about 500 million, could shrink to as low as 300 million by 2100. Projections vary about when exactly global population will peak and begin to decline, but all major demographic forecasts project population growth trending in the same direction. Absent a radical change in the demography of a rapidly modernizing and urbanizing planet, global population is likely to peak and begin to decline late in this century or early in the next.

Taken together, declining fertility, slowing per capita economic growth, the changing composition of economic activity, and continuing improvements in technology and resource productivity are likely, toward the end of this century, to bring a peak and decline in the consumption of most important resources, and in impacts upon the environment. In fact, for absolute material demands upon the natural environment not to decline over the long term, one of these three robust trends would need to reverse itself. Global fertility trends would need to start rising again. Long-term slowing of growth rates in industrialized economies would need to reverse. Or a broad swath of food, energy, and resource technologies would need to start to become less resource-efficient.

Smil, like a number of other environmental scholars, contests this notion. Instead, he argues that increases in resource productivity will not be put toward lower resource demands but toward more consumption and faster economic growth. Increasingly efficient steam engines in the nineteenth century famously did not result in a reduction in the use of coal but the opposite. One hundred fifty years of improving lighting efficiency hasn’t resulted in lower use of energy for lighting but rather has inspired us to light up many more things. Much of the long-term improvement in the efficiency of internal combustion engines, Smil notes, has gone toward creating larger and more powerful vehicles. As long as there is pent up demand for more consumption, some portion of productivity gains will be put toward more consumption rather than less resource use.

But the claim that these “rebound” effects assure the endless growth of material consumption assumes that demand for them will never saturate. For that to be true, it must also be the case that the wealthier we get, the more material consumption we will demand, forever. Thirty-six-ounce steaks must become 72-ounce steaks, SUVs must become eighteen-wheelers, 2,000-square-foot split-level ranch homes must become 4,000-square-foot McMansions, and so on.

There is really not much evidence for that proposition. Despite our affinity for supersizing our homes, our automobiles, and our portions, the U.S. economy has nonetheless been following the same basic trajectory as all other developed economies: toward slower national and per capita income growth and consumption of material goods and services. Rockefeller University’s Jesse Ausubel has studied one hundred key resources in the United States over the past century, such as cropland, water, electricity, nickel, and petroleum. Over a third of them are past peak consumption. Similarly, the United States and much of the European Union have seen falling greenhouse gas emissions over the last decade or more, even accounting for the outsourcing of industrial production to places like China.

Globally, by contrast, resource use and carbon emissions continue to rise, despite long-term and ongoing improvements in resource productivity. This is the reason that Smil characterizes claims that economic growth might decouple from material and energy inputs as “highly misleading.” But the fact that overall demand for material goods and services has risen during the postwar period, when the global population has tripled and billions of people have moved from deep agrarian poverty to urban and industrial living arrangements provides no strong basis for Smil’s argument.

As both population and economic growth rates flatten out over the course of this century, it is likely that resource-productivity gains will overtake global economic growth rates, resulting in falling global demand for material resources over the long term. As a 2019 Breakthrough Institute report showed, global pasture land, the largest single human use of land, peaked in 2000 and continues to decline even as global beef production continues to rise. In a 2013 paper, Ausubel and colleagues argued that global cropland too appears close to peaking, even as global crop production continues to rise.

As with all growth curves, peak consumption of various material resources is not guaranteed to last. These trends could represent the top of a bell curve, the bottom of a new S-curve, or just a long plateau. But what they do demonstrate is that absolute decoupling of resources from economic growth is possible, even given a global economy today that still features robust population and income growth.

Smil’s case for establishing limits to growth depends upon a further claim: that preserving economic growth while reducing environmental impacts can’t happen soon enough to avoid surpassing key biophysical boundaries, which would lead to catastrophe for human societies. But Smil is too aware of the many failed proclamations of environmental scientists to make any strong or specific claim about what those biophysical limits might be. “Forecasting the state of modern civilization for generations or centuries to come remains an impossible exercise,” he acknowledges.

Elsewhere — for example in his 2010 book Energy Myths and Realities — Smil has been less than catastrophic about global warming, the environmental risk most commonly thought to threaten the long-term survival of human societies. Nor does he worry that we will run out of resources. Instead, he invokes poorly defined challenges having to do with arable land, soil erosion, depleted aquifers, and crop productivity, combined with a changing climate. He is quite certain, though, that none of it can be sustained. “Pursuit of the highest possible economic growth rates, extending the culture of excessive consumption to additional billions of people, and treating the biosphere as a mere assembly of goods and services to be exploited (and used as a dumping ground) with impunity,” he argues, “must change in radical ways.”

In the end, Smil does offer a prediction of sorts, if not a very strong one. By the end of this century, he argues, human societies will need to impose limits upon economic growth in order to sustain human wellbeing for the long term. But as prophecy, Smil’s prediction is less provocative than it might first appear. By the end of this century, global population will likely be approaching zero growth anyway and a much more industrialized global economy will likely be struggling with the same headwinds to sustained rates of per capita growth that developed economies have been struggling with for decades.

In this regard, Smil’s prognostication, should it come to pass, would follow a similar pattern to many other environmental laws and regulations. Environmental restrictions have often lagged, not led, the peaking of pollution and other environmental impacts. We “saved” the whales only after we had hunted many global populations to extirpation, and developed better substitutes for most of the resources we depended upon them for. Forests have returned across many parts of the United States, Europe, and Latin America after we no longer needed those lands to grow food. One 2005 study found that 76 percent of protected areas across Latin America and the Caribbean was under little threat of human development without protection, a dynamic that appears to be the case globally as well. We reached a global agreement to protect the ozone only after DuPont had developed a cheap substitute for chlorofluorocarbons.

In answer to modern environmentalism’s tautology, Smil offers redundancy. Human societies will need to impose global limits to growth, he suggests, around the time that growth, or at least growing demands upon resources, will likely be coming to an end anyway.

Given how much damage two centuries of unprecedented growth and economic development have done to the biosphere, many imagine, understandably, that the end of growth might be a panacea for the natural world. But we should not be so quick to assume that a smaller and less affluent human population will necessarily bring lower demands upon natural resources.

History is replete with episodes where much smaller human populations accounted for environmental destruction at large scales. Early North Americans in the paleolithic era cleared most of the continent’s forests and hunted mammoths and other megafauna into extinction. Across human history, roughly three-quarters of deforestation in temperate forests occurred before the Industrial Revolution, when the human population was less than a billion people, almost all of whom lived in deep poverty compared to today’s industrial standards.

More recently, economic crises in relatively developed regions, such as Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, and Greece have led to serious environmental consequences, as economically struggling populations turned to forests for firewood and to illegal hunting and fishing for food, to devastating effect.

For this reason, degrowth offers no guarantee that environmental impacts will decline. This is all the more so as calls for degrowth are frequently coupled with demands for a return to simpler, less technological, and non-synthetic systems for the provision of food and energy and for production of material goods and services. Less affluent economies more dependent upon production systems that use less technology would substantially increase the resource demands associated with consumption, and would erode or even entirely offset the benefits of lower levels of consumption.

#### Growth outruns recurrent blackball risks and shifts public preference to optimal existential risk mitigation---unlocks infinite future value.

Aschenbrenner ’20 [Leopold; September 6; Research Fellow in Economics at the Forethought Foundation and Global Priorities Institute at the University of Oxford, B.A. from Columbia University; Global Priorities Institute, “Existential risk and growth,” no. 6]

Secondly, note that this existential risk Kuznets curve appears in the transition dynamics of the optimal allocation. Considering that existential risk mitigation is a global public good, it is unlikely resources are allocated to safety optimally in the real world. As such, this should not be taken to be a prediction of what a particular country with a particular set of institutions will do with regard to existential risk.

Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why we might still be interested in the transition dynamics under the (impatient) optimal allocation. For one, since there are very long timescales involved here, it is very hard to know (and thus model) what government and societal institutions will evolve to deal with existential risk. However, the ideal these institutions will likely aim at is the optimal allocation. The optimal allocation might thus be a rough proxy for the real-world allocation.

Moreover, the (impatient) optimal allocation represents what I would call the “democratic possibilities frontier” or the “impatient public possibilities frontier.” Those who are principally concerned about the long-run future of humanity and advocate for a zero rate of pure time preference might want us to spend as much as possible on safety in order to avoid existential catastrophe and enable human flourishing millions of years into the future. Indeed, even in the Hamiltonian of the optimal allocation, the relative value of life ˜vt is a discounted term; the lower your discount rate ρ, the more you would want to spend on safety. However, the broader public is not so patient. As the empirical evidence cited earlier shows, people tend to have a (relatively large) positive rate of pure time preference; the public is impatient. Even perfectly designed institutions that take into account existential risk externalities will ultimately be constrained by the degree to which society actually cares about the future—they will be constrained by an impatient public. The existential risk Kuznets curve illustrates the implications of this impatience. On the one hand, this impatience results in a period of initially rising levels of risk. For example, this might mean that the arguably rising level of existential risk of the past century is not necessarily a market failure, but may well be part of the optimal path given positive pure time preference. On the other hand, rising standards of living lead even the most impatient public to start caring more about safety and averting an existential catastrophe. This leads workers and scientists to be shifted to the safety sector, eventually causing the hazard rate δ to exponentially decline. Even if people are impatient, if you make them well off enough, they will start caring about existential risk.

Seeing the arguably rising levels of existential risk in the past century, some might call for an end to economic growth. Yet this existential risk Kuznets curve indicates that stopping economic growth would be deleterious: it would simply freeze the hazard rate at a high level, leading to a fatal catastrophe sooner or later. Economic growth enables even an impatient public with a high rate of pure time preference to start caring about life, thus ultimately reducing risk and even leading to positive M ∞.

Some prominent thinkers have previously posited that humanity is passing through a unique period with an elevated risk of technological catastrophe. Sagan (1994) calls this the “time of perils.” Parfit (2011, p. 616), concurs:

We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy.

This existential risk Kuznets curve provides theoretical evidence that grounds the intuition that we are living in a “time of perils.” We may be economically advanced enough to have created the means for our permanent destruction, but not economically advanced enough to care enough about decreasing this existential risk.

This “time of perils” has profound implications. For instance, those alive today who care about preserving the long-term future of humanity may have extraordinary altruistic leverage. By working to reduce existential risk now (increasing the resources dedicated to safety), they can reduce the area under the “hump” of the hazard rate δ. This in turn increases M∞, unlocking tremendous value. Moreover, since so few resources are dedicated to safety at the moment, there are likely very high marginal value opportunities available to work on safety. This is a unique situation. Suppose existential risk did not decline to zero exponentially: then M∞ = 0 regardless—the existential risk curve would never bend—so reducing risk now would not change the probability of a long and flourishing future of humanity. And if existential risk did not initially increase, it would never be such a substantial challenge and there wouldn’t be such high marginal value opportunities to work on reducing it.

#### Only legal checks on big capitalism can drive sustainable capitalism – that solves warming and human extinction

Goodwin, 21 – Jacqueline, citing Chris Marquis, Author and Professor at the Cornell SC Johnson School of Business. “Is Sustainable Capitalism Achievable Through The B Corp Movement?” Grow Ensemble, Feb 11, <https://growensemble.com/sustainable-capitalism/> -- Iowa

Capitalism came into fruition when the world was full of seemingly inexhaustible resources. But as we know, this is no longer the case. The industrial revolution is over, our eyes are now open to the effects of our ways of doing business, and business as usual threatens our survival.

With only 100 companies responsible for 71% of global emissions and many more bringing up the tail end of pollution, things are prime for the changing. Luckily, some people see this as the threat it is, and they are using their businesses to fight back.

Consumers in today’s markets are increasingly aware of corporate transgressions against the broader wellbeing of humans and the planet we all share. An economic system that rewards corporate profit at all cost at the expense of everyone else is losing its shine.

One way we’re seeing a shift in the global economy is through what some call “sustainable capitalism,” a philosophy embraced by the B Corp movement. Professor and author Chris Marquis is a strong proponent of the idea that capitalism doesn’t have to be bad. It can be a force for good when structured through the lens of sustainable businesses.

Chris spoke on the Social Entrepreneurship & Innovation Podcast about how the B Corp movement is integral to shifting businesses toward social good and how much progress they’ve made in the last decade for a more equitable, livable future.

What Is Sustainable Capitalism?

First, let’s define plain old capitalism as it predominantly functions in society today. Capitalism is an economic and political system in which production is privately controlled to create profit for its private owners.

Given the opportunity for and evidence of exploitation and abuse when profit is the motivator and it’s all held by for the benefit of a small group, “sustainable capitalism” may sound like an oxymoron.

But the concept of sustainable capitalism stands for the idea that capitalism, when wielded justly, is capable of being a force for good in the world. Sustainable capitalism seeks to meet the needs of the present without compromising the needs of the future. This form of capitalism doesn’t seek profit to make a few wealthy, it seeks profit that can fuel positive change for shared benefit. It also regenerates by putting as many resources back into the environment as were taken, if not replenishing it with more than it had before.

The roots of sustainable capitalism actually date back to 1999, when the term “natural capitalism” was coined by authors Amory Hunter, L. Hunter Lovins, and Paul Hawken, to describe the reintegration of ecological (as well as economic) goals into business.

Why Isn’t Capitalism Sustainable?

Through individual pursuit of wealth and state pursuit of high GDP (gross domestic product), countries like the United States have expanded at the expense of the planet, fueling global warming. The measuring stick for success is profit and it’s pursued at all cost. While the financial gain is narrowly focused on a small group, the capitalist system has given rise to corporations that are alarmingly responsible for environmental destruction we all have to pay for.

In a paper on sustainable capitalism, author John Ikerd points out that, “all economic value comes from either earth or society. The economy itself produces nothing of value; it simply facilitates our individual relationships with each other and with the earth.”

Capitalism has been destroying the exact thing that makes it successful: natural capital. And, these corporations create suffering for the other resource that gives it life as well: human beings. If the only focus is to bring in money, then supporting sustainable livelihoods for the people within a corporation is perceived as a direct threat to the main objective. This human exploitation may not exist between decision makers of a company but further down the supply chain—out of sight, out of mind, and still, often, even if in sight, still pushed out of mind.

If corporations continue to be reliant on fossil fuels, deforestation, and unjust labor practices, they’ll eventually put themselves out of business or they will have destroyed the only world we have that can host them.

Take Coca Cola for example. The corporation is the top plastic polluter in the world, causing irreparable damage to our waterways and our bodies by contributing to the plastic that seeps its way into our food, our drinking water, and even our clothes.

How does plastic get into the ocean and into our bodies? It comes from microplastics that have slowly broken down over time from, say, plastic Coke bottles. Of course, the pollution hurts the general public, but Coca Cola itself relies on clean drinking water for their products as well. In other words, by continuing business as usual, Coke is threatening the very natural resource that they need to survive as a company—water sources and the people who they need to buy their products.

Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?

We think yes, as long as companies can uncompromisingly preserve sustainability in business. And when this can turn into a requirement by law, we have even more faith in it. The evolution of capitalism suggests that consumers have the power to mold the future of the economy to take a form that is more in sync with their ethics and values. Studies show promising trends: 70% of millennials say they would stop supporting a business they don’t agree with and 66% say they are willing to pay more for a product that does social or environmental good.

Businesses that embrace the sustainable capitalism ideals are doing amazing things: innovating waste-free products, dispersing ownership in their business, engaging in reforestation projects, implementing fair hiring practices to reduce recidivism, the list goes on and on. So, good news: some businesses are already reshaping the capitalist paradigm by minding the triple bottom line, prioritizing the social and environmental impact before profit. But, as in all heavy-weight changes, there is still progress to be made.

First, legislative efforts to cap fossil fuel emissions and hold companies accountable for their levels of pollution are essential. Laws and regulations should incentivize renewable energy for companies of any size to do business in a truly sustainable way. Secondly, there must be a movement away from narrow shareholder primacy and into greater community benefit including stakeholders affected by business at every stage of operations.

The B Corporation Movement

b corp movement

We’re big fans of the B Corporation movement. So, what is a B Corp? A B Corporation (aka B Corp) is a business that has undergone a rigorous third-party certification process by the nonprofit B Lab, earning the force for good business star that comes with the Certified B Corporation label. To meet the standard, B Corps have to put purpose at the core of their business. It has to run through each decision and development in the company. They’re exceptionally mission-driven companies and often are founded purely to fight global issues like waste pollution or resource access.

There are more than 3,500 Certified B Corps around the globe of various sizes whose values extend beyond shareholders, prioritizing benefits for all stakeholders within their community. In 2020, two B Corporations went public, and six multinational corporations are in the process of certifying. Each company is evaluated through a B Impact Assessment that measures key impact areas: corporate governance, the environment, workers, customers, and community. This evaluation shows a path forward to a sustainable economy that doesn’t leave much room for the flaws of traditional capitalism. Every aspect of the B Corp movement is about meeting the highest standards for positive impact. Within the B Corp community, positive impact is non-negotiable, and members of the B Corp community are always raising the bar not only for what’s possible, but what is expected.

If you’re buying something new, would you choose to support a B Corp or a polluting, exploitative, traditional company? Okay, maybe that’s a loaded question. But really. If you’re on the B Corp train, we’re right there with you. As more and more consumers make these choices, traditionally operating companies won’t be able to compete as they once did.

The B Corp Difference

business for good

The difference between B Corps and the large companies traded on Wall Street who may have corporate social responsibility initiatives lies in their motive. B Corps exist to provide a benefit to people and the planet. Innovation is embedded within their DNA, instead of being an afterthought. Their sustainability efforts exceed beyond the short-term and their decision-making is rooted in the solution that’s best for everyone involved, not just investors.

B Corps need to certify every three years and track metrics to ensure adherence to all guidelines year over year. This covers any changes in supply chains and business models. Keep in mind that a B Corp is not always a “benefit corporation.” Public Benefit Corporations (PBC) adhere to a legal structure that prioritizes purpose, transparency, and accountability. This is a recognized legal status in 35 states that indicate a business is committed to legal requirements around impact. On the contrary, a corporation with a flimsy CSR program in place simply isn’t beholden to the same level of accountability.

Chris Marquis, Author and Professor at Cornell University

In 2009, Chris’s students at Harvard Business School told him that while they enjoyed learning about the corporate social responsibility practices of big companies, they preferred the erupting B Corporation movement and its loyal collection of socially conscious businesses.

The more Chris learned about the B Corp Movement, the more he saw how it could positively impact all ecosystems across economic, environmental, and social sectors. His decade of research into sustainable businesses yielded his new book, Better Business: How the B Corp Movement Is Remaking Capitalism.

Chris now lives in New York and teaches at the Cornell SC Johnson School of Business. His research has won multiple awards and he continues to explore how sustainable capitalism can reshape the modern understanding of capitalistic economies, all while educating the next generation of CEOs, co-founders, and economists.

“The B Impact Assessment is like a learning tool. It’s a benchmarking tool, you learn about what best practices are, you learn about what other companies are doing. It really provides a way to become authentically stakeholder-driven. And because you’re measuring these items, you can actually also be more accountable and transparent as well.”

Take Action: Supporting the B Corp Movement & Sustainable Capitalism

As consumers, there are a number of ways that we can participate in the trajectory of the economy and the future of capitalism.

Shop B Corp: Use the B Corp Directory to search the B Corp community for brands that align with your own values to make a positive environmental impact. You might recognize some of your favorite brands like Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia!

Do Some Digging: If you have a favorite clothing or electronic company, dig deeper into their backgrounds. Do they have standards for social and environmental responsibility? Do they outline how they’re meeting benchmarks in sustainability and emissions reductions? If not, consider spending your dollars elsewhere and look for alternatives at Buy Ensemble.

Shop Local: Your locally owned zero waste or wine shops are the brainchild of a dreamer in your own backyard. Support these startups or small businesses in your local community and witness the power of business before your eyes.

Closing: A Better Future For People & Planet

Capitalistic economies don’t have to put people and the planet last on the agenda. The B Corp movement illustrates how the wellbeing of the planet and business can be connected, just as humanity is to the planet.

Our collective future is dependent on the decisions we make today. From how we choose to spend our money and even whether or not we use socially responsible banks to hold our money in the meantime, we can all make an impact on the future of sustainable capitalism.

### Transition Turn

#### The aff leads to a violent transition – that turns both their racial fascism and environment impacts

Bifo 11 - professor of social history of communication at the academia di belle arti of Milan (franco bifo berardi, after the future,)

The proliferation of singularities (the withdrawal and building of NonTemporary Autonomous Zones) will be a pacific process, but the conformist majority will react violently, and this is already happening. The conformist majority is frightened by the fleeing away of intelligent energy and simultaneously is attacking the expression of intelligent activity. The situation can be described as a fight between the mass ignorance produced by mediatotalitarianism and the shared intelligence of the general intellect. We cannot predict what the outcome of this process will be. Our task is to extend and protect the field of autonomy, and to avoid as much as possible any violent contact with the field of aggressive mass ignorance. This strategy of 119 non-confrontational withdrawal will not always succeed. Sometimes confrontation will be made inevitable by racism and fascism. It is impossible to predict what has to be done in the case of unwanted conflict. Non-violent reaction is obviously the best choice, but it will not always be possible. The identification of wellbeing with private property is so deeply rooted that a barbarization of the human environment cannot be completely ruled out. But the task of the general intellect is exactly this: fleeing from paranoia, creating zones of human resistance, experimenting autonomous forms of production based on high-tech-low-energy production – whilst avoiding confrontation with the criminal class and the conformist population. Politics and therapy will be one and the same activity in the coming time. People will feel hopeless and depressed and panicking, because they are unable to deal with the post-growth economy, and because they will miss the dissolving modern identity. Our cultural task will be attending to those people and taking care of their insanity, showing them the way of a happy adaptation at hand. Our task will be the creation of social zones of human resistance that act like zones of therapeutic contagion. The process of autonomization has not to be seen as Aufhebung, but as therapy. In this sense it is not totalizing and intended to destroy and abolish the past. Like psychoanalytic therapy it is rather to be considered as an unending process.

#### Vote neg on presumption

Bifo 11 - professor of social history of communication at the academia di belle arti of Milan (franco bifo berardi, after the future,)

Actually, I do not have a happy end for my fabulation. I do not see in the foreseeable future any discernable subjectivation, resurrection of consciousness, or emancipatory form. And I do not like to cheat at this game, I do not like the empty words of self-reassurance, and the rhetoric of the multitude. So I prefer to tell the truth, at least, the limited truth as I see it: there is no way out, social civilization is over, the neoliberal precarization of labor and the mediadictatorship have destroyed the cultural antibodies that in the past made resistance possible. As far as I know But what I know is only what I can see from my limited point of observation, of course. During the 20th century the moral revolt against exploitation was based on the realistic prospect of the autonomy of society from the cultural and economic domination of capitalist rule. This prospect was based on a realistic approach to the analysis of the actual condition. Then something changed: during the last decades I have witnessed the mutation induced by the capitalist economy, and I have come to think that this mutation is irreversible: it has not only affected the social sphere, but also the semiotic, biological and psychic sphere. Therefore my knowledge and my understanding disown the possibility of an alternative, of an escape from the hell emerging as the legacy of thirty years of unfettered capitalist rule.